November 3, 2020

Office of Administration
Mail Stop TWFN-7-A60M
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Washington, D.C.  20555-0001
ATTN: Program Management, Announcements, and Editing Staff

Re: Interim Storage Partners (ISP) Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Project,
Docket ID NRC-2016-0231

Dear Office of Administration Staff:

As Governor of Texas, I strongly oppose ISP’s application for a license to construct and operate a consolidated interim storage facility in Andrews County, Texas. Having consulted with numerous state agencies, including the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, and the Texas Department of Transportation, I urge the NRC to deny ISP’s license application.

If ISP’s license application were approved, its proposed facility would store spent nuclear fuel and Greater-Than-Class-C waste, both of which present a greater radiological risk than Texas is prepared to allow. This deadly radioactive waste — up to 40,000 metric tons of uranium — would sit right on the surface of the facility in dry cask storage systems. Spent nuclear fuel is so dangerous that it belongs in a deep geologic repository, not on a concrete pad above ground in Andrews County. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10101(18); Nevada v. DOE, 457 F.3d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006). This location could not be worse for storing ultra-hazardous radioactive waste.

Andrews County lies within the Permian Basin Region, which has surpassed Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar Field as the largest producing oilfield in the world. There are approximately 250,000 active oil-and-gas wells in Texas’s portion of the Permian Basin. In 2019, oil production in the Permian Basin exceeded 1.5 billion barrels, and the oil-and-gas industry directly employed 87,603 individuals in the region. Also in 2019, the Permian Basin was responsible for $9 billion in severance taxes and royalties to the State of Texas. In 2018, the Permian Basin produced more than 30 percent of total U.S. crude oil and contained more than 40 percent of proved oil reserves. In short, the Permian Basin is a significant economic and natural resource for the entire country.

The proposed ISP facility imperils America’s energy security because it would be a prime target for attacks by terrorists, saboteurs, and other enemies. Spent nuclear fuel is currently scattered across the country at various reactor sites and storage installations. Piling it up on the surface of the Permian
Basin, as ISP seeks to do, would allow a terrorist with a bomb or a hijacked aircraft to cause a major radioactive release that could travel hundreds of miles on the region’s high winds. Such an attack would be uniquely catastrophic because, on top of the tragic loss of human life, it would disrupt the country’s energy supply by shutting down the world’s largest producing oilfield. The Permian Basin is already a target for America’s enemies, and granting ISP’s license application would paint an even bigger bullseye.

Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the NRC has an obligation to consider the environmental effects of a terrorist attack on the proposed ISP facility. See Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016, 1028–35 (9th Cir. 2006); but see N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 136–43 (3d Cir. 2009) (creating circuit split on issue); New York v. NRC, 589 F.3d 551, 554 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (avoiding circuit split because “the NRC did sufficiently take into account acts of terrorism”). Perhaps recognizing as much, the NRC addressed the risk of terrorism in section 4.19 of its Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.23 (cross-referencing NUREG-2157). The Generic Environmental Impact Statement determined (at page 4-97) that terrorism’s “environmental risk is SMALL” during the period beyond a facility’s license term. But see 42 U.S.C. § 2210e (reflecting Congress’s judgment that the risk of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility warrants the NRC’s careful attention).

Now, in sections 1.4.4 and 5.1.3 of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the license application in Andrews County, the NRC apparently seeks to apply its generic terrorism determination to ISP. The proposed ISP facility, however, would be a uniquely provocative target: The probability of a terrorist attack is higher than for a generic reactor site, because the consequences are higher when a terrorist can disrupt the country’s energy supply with a major radioactive release. So the Generic Environmental Impact Statement does not adequately assess terrorism risk as to ISP in particular, while the Draft Environmental Impact Statement does not speak to that issue at all. Indeed, the word “terrorism” appears just once, in a mere citation, in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (at page 2-31).

Although the Draft Environmental Impact Statement repeatedly refers to ISP’s construction and operation of a “consolidated interim storage facility,” it would be naïve to believe the highlighted word. ISP’s application seeks a 40-year license, with the possibility of a 20-year renewal. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement simply assumes (at pages xix, 1-3, 2-2, 8-1, 9-16) that a permanent geologic repository will be developed and licensed before those 60 years are up, without addressing any contingency for the spent nuclear fuel if such a repository is not ready when ISP’s license expires. Those rosy assumptions are unsound: Radioactive waste has “the capacity to outlast human civilization as we know it,” Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam), and any spent nuclear fuel that comes to the proposed ISP facility will be there to stay.

Congress began working on a lasting solution to the spent nuclear fuel problem by passing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, which set standards for a permanent geologic repository, and the NWPA Amendments Act of 1987, which designated Yucca Mountain as the only site for it. Today, 38 years later, there is still no permanent geologic repository, with Yucca Mountain effectively having been abandoned. See, e.g., New York v. NRC, 824 F.3d 1012, 1014–15 (D.C. Cir. 2016); In re Aiken County, 645 F.3d 428, 430–33 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Once again, then, “[t]he [NRC] apparently has no long-term plan other than hoping for a geologic repository. If the government continues to fail in its quest to establish one, then [spent nuclear fuel] will seemingly be stored on site at nuclear plants on a permanent
basis. The [NRC] can and must assess the potential environmental effects of such a failure.” New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

The Generic Environmental Impact Statement concedes (at page 4-95) that “additional security requirements may be necessary in the future if spent fuel remains in storage for a substantial period of time. Under those circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that, if necessary, the NRC will issue orders or enhance its regulatory requirements for ISFSI and DTS security, as appropriate, to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security.” This approach to future terrorist threats — essentially, a promise of I’ll tell you later — is not good enough and does not protect Texas and its citizens.

Finally, safe transportation of spent nuclear fuel would require specialized emergency response equipment and trained personnel, as well as significant infrastructure investments. Texas currently has four counties (Bexar, Dallas, Midland, and Nueces) and one city (San Antonio) that have passed resolutions prohibiting the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. According to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (at page 3-8), the cargo currently shipped on rail lines through the Permian Basin consists primarily of “oilfield commodities such as drilling mud, hydrochloric acid, fracturing sand, pipe, and petroleum products, including crude oil, as well as iron and steel scrap.” There are also significant agricultural commodities. In the event of a rail accident or derailment, even absent a radiological release, the resources and logistics required to address such an accident would severely disrupt the transportation of oilfield and agricultural commodities, to the detriment of the entire country.

In light of the grave risks associated with the proposed ISP facility, the absence of a permanent geologic repository, and the importance of the Permian Basin to the country’s energy security and economy, I respectfully and emphatically request that the NRC deny ISP’s license application.

Sincerely,

Greg Abbott
Governor

cc: The Honorable Dan Brouillette, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy
The Honorable Chad F. Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Colonel Steven C. McCraw, Director, Texas Department of Public Safety
Mr. Toby Baker, Executive Director, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
Ms. Ashley Forbes, Director, Radioactive Materials Division, TCEQ
Mr. James M. Bass, Executive Director, Texas Department of Transportation
Mr. Wei Wang, Executive Director, Texas Railroad Commission